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Housing as a Common Resource? Decommodification and 
Self-Organization in Housing – Examples from Germany 
and Switzerland
1 Introduction
Housing is something intimate. One could say that our homes represent a ‘third 
skin’ after clothing. Like clothes, shelter is regarded as a basic human need. Since 
this does not automatically translate into universal access in a less-than-perfect 
world, the provision of such basic goods is a fundamental political issue. A wide 
range of answers to the housing question have been developed in different times 
and places depending on the economic conditions and political hegemony. Both 
the market and the state have been hailed as the primary provider of housing and, 
even though the ‘third sector’ has mostly played a rather marginal role, there are 
noteworthy traditions of philanthropic and especially of self-help (cooperative) ini-
tiatives in housing.
The latter are certainly worth discussion in the context of the current ‘rediscov-
ery’ of the commons, as is the field of public housing. In this chapter, we will 
 attempt to sketch a typology of housing tenure and provision from a ‘commons per-
spective,’ examining to what extent housing can be seen as a common resource 
within different institutional arrangements. We will do this by analyzing a number 
of contemporary examples from Germany and Switzerland, two countries that are 
known as ‘tenants’ nations’ by virtue of having some of the lowest rates of own-
er-occupied homes among industrialized countries,1 and which thus represent a 
specific arena of marked contestations within the housing sector. Our analysis will 
follow the “analytical triad” that the editors of this volume put forth in defining 
the commons,2 following Exner and Kratzwald,3 Helfrich and Haas,4 and De 
 Angelis and Stravrides,5 among others, namely that:
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a) Housing is a basic urban resource, similar to infrastructure6 or land (but unlike the 
latter it is an ‘artificial’ resource,7 and thus costly).
b) Different actors play different roles in any arrangement of  housing provision. We 
may broadly speak of  ‘owners’ and ‘users’ (e.g. tenants), but, following Peter 
 Marcuse,8 we might be better off analyzing the specific ‘incidents of  ownership,’ 
i.e. the rights, powers, privileges, and immunities which individuals, groups or 
organizations hold with regard to a dwelling.9
c) This ‘bundle of  rights’ perspective points to the importance of  institutions that 
regulate the allocation of  housing. These mainly encompass 1) property rights, 
and 2) public policies, i.e. legislative and financial interventions on behalf  of  the 
(welfare) state.10
Analyzing specific cases according to this ‘commons triad,’ we will consider two 
major points in order to assess the ‘commons character,’ or lack thereof, of any 
given mode of housing provision, as illustrated in Figure 1.
First, we examine the extent to which housing is decommodified through a specific 
arrangement, i.e. how sustainably it is withdrawn from the sphere of profit-oriented, 
speculative real-estate markets. According to Andrej Holm, “decommodification, 
i.e. the withdrawal of housing provision from the market sphere, can be understood 
as the aim and the benchmark of housing policies and regulations.” 11 Hence, we 
 focus on the relation between housing as a resource and the institutional framework 
(property rights or policies) that might prevent this resource from being treated as a 
commodity. In a commons-based arrangement, housing would have to correspond 
to De Angelis’ description of “some sort of common pool of resources, under stood 
as non-commodified means of fulfilling people’s needs.” 12
Figure 1. Decommodification 
and self-organization: Two 
 criteria to assess arrangements 
of  housing Provision. 
highly decommodified strongly commodified
highly autonomous / 
self-organized
least autonomous / 
self-organized
Housing as a Common 
Resource? 
Housing as a 
Commodity 
Bereitgestellt von | Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 23.07.15 11:06
180
Second, to bring into focus the relevant actors, we consider the level of autonomy 
or self-organization that the inhabitants enjoy, individually or collectively, as the users 
of the resource that their homes constitute. This means determining which oppor-
tunities they have to influence decisions concerning their homes, i.e. whether they 
fit De Angelis’s definition of commoners “who share […] resources and who define 
for themselves the rules through which they are accessed and used.” 13
In the next section (2) we will offer a brief outline of the specific qualities of hous-
ing as a unique type of good and its role in the capitalist economy. Following this, 
we will describe and analyze different legal and economic arrangements from both 
the public and the cooperative sector in relation to the two criteria just described 
with regard to public policies (3) and property rights (4). Our ‘two-axis’ approach 
aims to contribute to an understanding of “what a particular form of tenure really 
means.” 14 In the conclusion (5) we will reflect on the paths that commoning efforts 
in the housing sector can take in the complex contemporary ‘late liberal’ situation, 
in which neither the state nor the market are fully capable of offering satisfactory 
solutions for a just and sustainable provision of basic urban resources, yet in which 
both must inevitably be taken into account – and actively engaged – in the course 
of any struggle for the commons.
We will argue that, although demands for public policy interventions in the hous-
ing sector are still necessary and justified, one should take into account the fact that 
these types of welfare provisions have proven vulnerable to swift enclosure, i.e. pri-
vatization. In this light, creative ‘hacks’ of property rights may be the more prom-
ising path towards institutional arrangements that provide housing as a kind of 
common resource: “If […] the components can be reduced to some basic enough 
common denominators […] one should, procedurally, be able to rebuild quite dif-
ferent systems with different arrangements of the pieces.” 15
2 Housing as a unique kind of  good and as a commodity
In order to grasp what is at stake in the field of housing provision, it is crucial to 
consider a number of qualities that make housing a unique kind of good. First and 
foremost, housing is, as already mentioned, an absolutely essential, necessary good. 
Not having a home is considered to be a severe impediment to a dignified human 
existence. Consequently, housing is considered a basic human right according to 
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 article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Secondly, housing is, in 
the vast majority of cases, the most immobile and, thirdly, the most durable of 
goods in modern capitalist economies. And, mainly because this durability makes 
it expensive to produce, it is, fourthly, also the most economically significant good 
in the life of most people, in that they spend more on it than on any other class of 
goods, be it via rent or via mortgages.16
This differentiation between renters and mortgage debtors points to what could 
be listed as the fifth particularity of housing: its institutional diversity, following 
Figure 2. “[W]hatever the constitutions of western countries might say […], in gen-
eral the populations of these countries do not have practical rights to housing by 
virtue of citizenship.” 17 In spite of its necessity, housing thus appears in various ‘in-
stitutional guises’ in the reality of contemporary capitalism.18 The same material 
 object – a house (or an apartment) – can take on different legal and economic forms. 
It can be a state-provided benefit or, as we will attempt to show, something like a 
common good, however it is currently more often treated like a commodity.
The ‘normal,’ i.e. prevalent, type of housing tenure in the majority of industrial-
ized countries is the owner-occupied home.19 By virtue of its ‘personalization,’ it 
might seem like a relatively strongly decommodified form of housing if one applies 
the well-known definition of Esping-Andersen,20 which posits that decommodifi-
cation of a good or benefit means that one does not need to generate income in 
 order to acquire, access, or maintain it. Yet perceiving decommodification as a mea-
sure of withdrawal of a good from market mechanisms, and in light of real-estate 
bubbles like the one in the United States that partly triggered the ongoing global 
Figure 2. Types of  housing 
tenure and provision. 
Owner-occupied Hosing Rental Housing
– ouright
– mortgaged
Commercially Rented
– from small / privrae landlords
– from large / corporate landlords
Non-Profit Housing (“Social Rented”)
– public housing ( government-owned)
–  privately owned social hosuing 
( government-subsidized)
–  cooperative housing (government-subsidized 
on some cases
–  “philanthropc” non-profit housing (provided by 
charitable foundations, religious organizations 
etc.; government-subsidized in some cases)
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economic crisis, it is evident that owner-occupied housing is indeed utterly com-
modified nowadays, constituting an indebtedness-ridden mass market. Yet the 
 position of the indebted homeowner is a very solitary one. In accordance with the 
phantasm of homo oeconomicus, to default on a mortgage seems like a personal failure, 
rather than the consequence of specific political and economic conditions beyond 
the individual debtor’s control.21 It may be that the discrepancy between the needs 
of everyday life and the basic tendency of a capitalist economy is more obvious for 
tenants whose monthly payments not only cover maintenance and administration, 
but are, in most cases, also expected to yield a profit for the landlord. For-profit 
rental units, which, together with owner-occupied homes, make up the “commer-
cial” housing sector, are the most common type of housing tenure in many urban 
areas. An illustration of the distribution of the various housing forms in the cases 
discussed can be found in Figure 3.
The treatment of homes as an ‘ordinary’ commodity has often been questioned. 
As exemplified by recent tenants’ struggles and ‘right to the city’ movements in 
 various German cities, which have succeeded in extending beyond the usual leftist 
suspects, rising rents, and forced evictions, i.e. the tangible facets of gentrification 
continue to be capable of raising disquiet at a very basic level.23 Housing issues thus 
constitute an arena for passionate contestations of the status quo.
* Owner-occupied and rented out, ** Owned by municipal, Land/cantonal or federal authorities, 
*** Charitable foundations, religious organizations etc. 
Figure 3. Types of  housing tenure and provision in selected German and Swiss cities (and Vienna, 
Austria), in percentages.22
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3 Decommodifying housing through public policies
The insistence on housing’s special status as a basic necessity, as articulated by  social 
movements throughout the twentieth century, has brought forth institutions that 
provide housing which is, to some degree or another, decommodified. Examples 
can be found in many urban areas in the two countries this chapter focuses on. As 
with other necessary social goods, the state – in the case of housing often in the 
form of local governments – has mostly been seen as the foremost agent of such 
decommodification measures. These can take a variety of forms whose character-
istics we want to explore in the following sections. We will first focus on public pol-
icies, such as subsidy schemes or zoning, and then turn to property-rights-related 
instruments.
3.1 Demand-side subsidies
The least ‘invasive’ instruments in governments’ surgical kits regarding housing 
provision are demand-side subsidies, which give people below a certain income-level 
money with which to pay their rent. In both Germany and Switzerland, these kinds 
of benefits are part of the standard (‘income maintenance’) welfare payment sys-
tems, and are regulated at the national level. In both cases, beneficiaries receive a 
separate payment for housing costs corresponding to their actual rent (whereas the 
basic monthly benefit for all other living costs is fixed).24 These welfare payments 
thus do not form part of any explicit housing regulation, even though they influ-
ence the residential sector in major ways. Many landlords who offer inexpensive 
housing, for instance, cater directly to welfare recipients, demanding the highest 
possible rent that welfare agencies will allow per square meter or per apartment, 
thus securing a steady source of revenue. At the same time, as recent studies have 
shown,25 demand-side subsidies tend to turn many centrally located districts into 
‘forbidden cities’ for the welfare-dependent. The ‘subject-based-support’ approach 
thus fails to counter (and in part supports) the spatial segregation of different  social 
groups which itself ultimately threatens the distinct qualities of ‘the urban’ that lie 
in “social differentiation without exclusion.”26 Demand-side subsidies attempt to 
remedy an individual disadvantage without addressing the underlying question of 
how the allocation of a necessary good through market mechanisms can ever work 
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for those lacking sufficient ‘purchasing power.’ Therefore, they certainly don’t 
 encourage arrangements that would provide housing as a common resource. And 
since the affected tenants are only regarded as market players, the issue of strength-
ening their autonomy and self-organization does not even come into view.
3.2 Supply-side subsidies
It thus seems evident that governments should consider intervening on the supply 
side of housing provision as well. Although housing has been called a “wobbly pil-
lar” of the welfare state (compared with the classic trinity of health care, education, 
and income maintenance),27 there have indeed been major public efforts to provide 
decent and affordable housing for both the working and the middle classes, espe-
cially during the inter-war and the post-war periods.28 In the command economies 
of state socialist regimes such as the German Democratic Republic, the state di-
rected virtually the entire housing and construction sector in a centralist, top-down 
manner. In the post-war heydays of expanding welfare states, this was to some 
 extent paralleled by Western governments’ housing programs. In the aftermath of 
World War II, West Germany funded the construction of 3.3 million homes in just 
a decade.29 Objektförderung, the subsidizing not of individuals’ housing costs, but of 
“objects,” i.e. buildings, can work in different ways. In both Germany and Switzer-
land, construction of affordable housing was mainly subsidized through low-inter-
est loans as well as non-repayable (“à fonds perdu”) contributions from government 
agencies at the local, Länder/Canton, and, in some instances, national level. In 
 return, the owners of the newly constructed homes were obligated to subtract the 
subsidy from their “cost rent” (Kostenmiete – rent covering the costs of the capital 
taken up for the investment and running costs, including maintenance, but not 
yielding an additional profit), thus passing it on to the tenants. The make-up of rent 
prices is illustrated in Figure 4.
One core element of the (West) German social housing system (sozialer Wohnungs-
bau) that continued throughout the second half of the twentieth century was that 
subsidies were generally paid regardless of a building’s ownership. Publicly owned 
corporations and cooperatives (see below) benefited from this system, yet so did 
private (individual or corporate) owners who were left to do with their property as 
they pleased once the contractually agreed subsidy period was over. This system of 
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“social housing as temporary occupation” 30 was, after numerous cutbacks starting 
in the 1980s, de facto ended on the federal level in 200131 and continues only in heav-
ily downsized forms in the Länder. It came to be regarded as notoriously prone to 
inefficiency and downright corruption, since it contained no real incentives to keep 
production and administration costs low. It yielded absurd arrangements in some 
cases, notably in (West) Berlin, where the rents in some (formerly) subsidized  estates 
are now above average while private or corporate owners and banks have been mak-
ing handsome profits.32 Considering that the subsidized units are destined from the 
outset to revert into regular, commercially rented homes in this type of arrange-
ment, it offers at best a temporary barrier to the commodification of housing (while 
breeding its own brand of speculation). And as it supports housing providers 
 regardless of their general purpose and organizational set-up (profit-oriented and 
hierarchical as well as non-profit and participatory entities), it entails no particular 
promotion of inhabitants’ self-organization either.
3.3 Zoning
Apart from implementing (demand- or supply-side) ‘market intervention’ policies, 
governments can also facilitate the provision of affordable housing through their 
administrative powers. Recent amendments to a number of local zoning laws in 
Switzerland present one interesting example in this regard.33 Thanks to regulation 
similar to what is known in the United States as “inclusionary zoning,” municipal-
ities can proscribe a percentage of ‘affordable’ housing (in the ‘cost rent’ sense 
Figure 4. Composition of  rent 
prices. Profit   
  Subsidy     
Capital costs  
(interest and amortizement)       
Maintenance and  
administrative costs       
Cost Rent Subsidized 
Rent 
For-Profit 
(Market) Rent 
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 described above) for all new or redeveloped residential buildings within areas 
whose land-use designations are changed, allowing for higher building density. 
 Although housing affected by such regulation might be in the possession of owners 
who pursue a strongly profit-oriented strategy elsewhere (as with the ‘non-afford-
able’ part of the development in question), this form of development is decommod-
ified to some extent in the sense that the specific ‘incident of ownership’ that gives 
the owner the right to ask for payments for its use by others is restricted – as long 
as this zoning law is in place. Examples of such projects show that real-estate de-
velopers tend to strike a deal with non-profit organizations that acquire part of the 
lot through leasehold (Baurecht) and take over construction and management of the 
“affordable” part of the development. Since these are often cooperatives organized 
on a membership-basis (see below), this type of zoning may indirectly foster dwell-
ers’ self-organization.
4 Decommodifying housing through property rights
While the policies described so far may influence the provision of affordable hous-
ing to a notable degree, they can be changed, watered down, or abandoned. 
 Arrangements primarily regulated through government policies are subject to the 
political zeitgeist. In contrast, property rights in a narrower sense are consistently 
 respected in capitalist democracies, regardless of current political majorities. Instru-
ments that are directly linked to the property rights system might thus be capable 
of decommodifying housing in a more sustainable way and guaranteeing dwellers’ 
self-organization in the long run.
4.1 Public housing
Public housing in a strict sense, being the property of municipalities themselves, 
continues to play a significant role in many German and Swiss cities, as elsewhere, 
with local authorities being in possession of up to 15 percent of the total housing 
stock (please see Figure 3).34 In the current German discourse, it is often favorably 
compared by those who advocate decommodification of housing stocks to the 
Objekt förderung model described above. (Neo-)liberals, on the other hand, often crit-
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icize governments’ direct involvement in a sector that can be a highly profitable part 
of the capitalist economy.
Yet ideally, well-built and well-managed rental housing is financially self-support-
ing, i.e. the revenue generated through rents should cover the costs of the capital 
used to pay for its construction (and, if applicable, for land purchase), as well as 
 administrative and maintenance costs. Public housing thus need not cost a munic-
ipality anything per se and might, in the long run, become a valuable asset. Publicly 
owned homes produced in this manner count as ‘affordable housing’ in the sense 
that they are rented out at cost rent (see above). Due to production costs, however, 
they are usually not particularly inexpensive for decades after construction. This 
segment of public housing can thus be regarded as targeting a ‘broad segment’ 
of  the population, including the middle classes. Only some municipalities, usu-
ally ones with a strong social democratic tradition, adhere to this ‘broad’ public 
housing approach, but this includes some of the major cities in German-speaking 
 Europe.
A well-thought-out public housing system which goes beyond this residual sup-
ply to cater to broader parts of the population, rather than only those in the direst 
need of support, can be said to provide housing in a manner that exhibits a consid-
erable degree of decommodification. Yet this is only the case as long as the local 
government provides the necessary organizational means and refrains from cash-
ing in on its public housing stock by selling it to either the inhabitants (as in the UK 
case of the Thatcher government’s “right to buy” scheme), thus turning public 
dwellings into owner-occupied ones, which are theoretically resalable and thus 
commodified property, or even directly to corporate investors. We have lumped 
public housing in with those institutions that are linked to the property rights sys-
tem, yet because this one very powerful incident of ownership – the right to sell – 
lies with (local) governments, it is, in fact, subject to similar threats of enclosure as 
dwellings within the mainly policy-influenced arrangements described earlier. In 
other words, just because city-owned homes are not destined to be automatically 
 converted into for-profit rentals (as in the case of the German subsidy scheme de-
scribed above), they can still be privatized by a decision of the local legislative body, 
which is exactly what happened in the past few decades to hundreds of thousands 
of apartments in German cities.35 Furthermore, regarding the second axis in our 
model, the question of self-organization, public housing cannot be assessed too 
positively, as the welfare traditions it represents are closely connected to notions of 
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control and surveillance. In this light, it is not surprising that “many urban move-
ments today have lost confidence” not only “in the market as the optimal (and 
 equitable) provider” but also “in […] the state as a trustworthy steward for collec-
tive consumption,” as noted in the introduction to this volume. This points to the 
importance of non-state actors with respect to our topic.
4.2 Self-organization in housing: The cooperative/third sector
Although many types of providers of “third way” housing exist (e.g. charitable foun-
dations, religious communities), cooperatives are the most important ones in Ger-
man-speaking Europe. A cooperative (Genossenschaft in German), broadly under-
stood, is an association of people with the purpose of governing a certain set of 
economic affairs collectively. This often entails access to and use of a shared 
 resource. The cooperative model can thus be said to represent a classical institu-
tional form to organize what we call the commons. A housing cooperative’s mem-
bers are commoners in that they are usually both the tenants and, collectively, the 
owners of the real estate. Furthermore, although membership is based on subscrip-
tion for shares, the general assemblies of German and Swiss housing cooperatives 
usually operate on a one-person-one-vote basis, regardless of the value of each 
member’s holdings.
Thus, other than in the housing provision arrangements discussed previously, 
(democratic) self-organization can be said to constitute a core element of the coop-
erative model. And since cooperatives’ members obviously have no incentive to 
 extract profits from themselves, it seems plausible that they manage their housing 
stock as a “non-commodified means of fulfilling people’s needs.” 36 Yet depending 
on a cooperative’s members’ interests, they might, for instance, choose to sell a por-
tion of the housing stock on the open market. The adherence of cooperatives to 
the purpose of sustained decommodification of their housing stocks depends, to 
some extent, on regulation prescribed from outside. This can, for example, come 
in the form of membership in an umbrella organization that oversees the obser-
vance of such basic rules. In Switzerland, there are two national associations of 
housing cooperatives,37 both of which ask their member organizations to comply 
with the principles laid down in the “Charter of Non-Profit Housing Providers” 38 
which declares, among other things, that they are to provide affordable housing 
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which remains withdrawn from speculation, that they use the cost rent model, and 
that they forgo profit-seeking. The relevance of this charter lies in the fact that 
 adherence to it is widely used as a criterion for access to loans and other kinds of 
support from local and cantonal governments. It is also a requirement for receiv-
ing low-interest loans from two bank-like institutions supported by the Swiss Con-
federation that cater exclusively to cooperatives and other non-profit housing orga-
nizations.39 The legal concept of Gemeinnützigkeit (non-profit status; literally “the 
quality of operating in favor of the common good”) was, in contrast, never para-
mount in the German system of Objektförderung, and the tax benefits connected to 
this status within the housing sector were abolished in 1989.40
Recognizing only non-profit organizations as eligible for public support, the 
Swiss system of Trägerförderung (“financial support for providers”) has clearly proven 
more up to the task of permanently decommodifying certain housing stocks.41 
While only a marginal influence in most rural and suburban areas, Trägerförderung 
has been influential in creating a significant portion of non-profit housing in some 
cities. The most notable example is Zurich, Switzerland’s largest city, where coop-
erative housing amounts to about 18 percent of the total stock, in addition to about 
7 percent public housing, thus placing the total share of the “gemeinnützige” sector at 
a quarter (see Figure 3). In 2011, voters approved a referendum obliging the city gov-
ernment to raise this percentage to a third by 2050. Apartments whose construc-
tion is directly subsidized by municipal (often supplemented by cantonal) funds, 
and which are therefore allocated on a needs basis, only make up a small part of co-
operative estates. The city government’s arguably most important instrument in 
supporting cooperatives is not a financial policy, but relates, again, to the property 
rights system. Through leasehold contracts (Baurechtsverträge), cooperatives can ac-
quire city-owned land for very long periods, usually sixty years, for an annual rent. 
This title allows them to construct housing on these lots and to use them as collat-
eral when raising the necessary capital for the project. The municipality, on the 
other hand, can facilitate the construction of affordable, non-profit housing with-
out spending money of its own and without giving away public property  irretrievably.
Bereitgestellt von | Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 23.07.15 11:06
190
4.3 Commoning by “hacking” the law?
Leasehold agreements are part of the property rights system and can govern the 
 relation between any landowner and leaser, but they are by no means specifically 
designed to support cooperative housing. Zoning laws (which fall within the do-
main of public policies) are also not intended to require a percentage of affordable 
housing, as described above; their main purpose is rather to determine the permis-
sible physical design of buildings – height, density etc. – in a given area. In order to 
achieve a measure of decommodification for certain housing stocks, these legal in-
struments were thus used in different ways than originally intended in the cases we 
have  examined. This could be described as “hacking” the law 42 – a concept that 
might become clearer once we introduce its arguably most accomplished applica-
tion in the cooperative sector.
Many cooperatives in Germany and Switzerland became estranged from their so-
cial movement roots after World War II. Their way of managing property hardly 
differed from the commercial real-estate business, and their members were less 
keen on actively participating in the democratic structures of self-organization that 
were theoretically still in place. This stagnation was criticized by a new, post-1968 
generation of housing activists with ties to various tenants’ struggles and protests 
against inconsiderate urban renewal projects; here squatting became one of the 
main protest methods.43 New organizational structures and legal models have since 
emerged among groups of squatters and former tenants that managed to become 
the lawful owners of their houses. The prime example is the Mietshäuser Syndikat, a 
network of collectively owned houses founded in 1992 which today comprises more 
than eighty individual housing initiatives all over Germany. It is technically not a 
cooperative as specified by German law, but a sort of elaborately checked and bal-
anced federation of limited liability companies (Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung, 
GmbH). An association of the inhabitants of each house within the network holds 
half of the shares in the company in possession of the respective building. The 
other half is held by the Syndikat, enabling it to prevent the house from ever being 
resold, even if its inhabitants wanted to cash in on it.44 The idea behind this veto 
function is to preserve the houses as strictly decommodified common resources, 
 regardless of the current users’ intentions. This organizational model, we argue, is 
an excellent example of a clever “hack” of property rights, i.e. of “components […] 
reduced […] to rebuild quite different systems with different arrangements of the 
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pieces,” 45 turning the “arch-capitalist” 46 corporate structure of a GmbH into a 
 vehicle for strictly non-profit projects. Considering this emphasis of access and use-
value as well as the high degree of autonomy that the individual inhabitants’ groups 
enjoy within the network, the houses belonging to the Syndikat can thus be said to 
more clearly constitute a common resource than traditional cooperative housing.
5 Conclusion
In order to highlight the defining characteristics of the various types of housing 
tenure described in this chapter, we suggest, as mentioned, arranging them along 
two axes, one marking a commodification-decommodification scale, the other de-
noting the extent of self-organization. As we have seen, public housing may, for in-
stance, be quite strongly decommodified, but it usually offers little room for tenants’ 
self-organization, embodying instead hierarchical and centralist principles. As an 
owner-occupier, on the other hand, one might find a home to feel relatively inde-
pendent in, but only as long as one can afford to pay the mortgage (Figure 5).
As we have attempted to show, and as Figure 5 illustrates, the crucial issue 
 regarding the decommodification of housing stocks is the permanency of the mea-
sures taken: public policies can restrict certain incidents of ownership that enable 
the use of housing as a commodity, yet often only temporarily – be it because a sub-
sidy scheme is set up to function in this way to begin with, as in the West German 
Figure 5. Types of  housing tenure and provision – decommodification and self-organization.
highly decommodified strongly commodified
highly autonomous /
self-organized
least autonomous /
self-organized
(temporarily 
decommodified) 
Commercially Rented 
Housing 
Privately Owned 
Subsidized Housing 
Other Non-Profit 
Housing 
(„Philantropic“) 
Public Housing 
Cooperative Housing 
Owner-Occupied 
Housing 
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sozialer Wohnungsbau, or because of a policy change, typically privatization (cf. the 
arrows in figure 5). Only if the most powerful incidents of ownership lie with 
 organizations that are perpetually bound, by internal and/or external regulation, to 
adhere to a non-profit strategy, can a housing stock be regarded as sustainably 
 decommodified.
This diagram is obviously a simplification of the actual institutional diversity in 
this field, but it can help us reflect on the paths that commoning efforts can take 
nowadays.47 Cooperative organizations that correspond to commons principles as 
neatly as the Mietshäuser Syndikat are currently a niche phenomenon. Plainly put, this 
type of collective project, involving hours of voluntary work, thus requiring a rather 
specific lifestyle and cultural capital of a certain kind, is not for everyone. Yet even 
taking into account traditional, large cooperatives, it seems crucial not to fall into 
the trap of expecting the third sector to act as an adequate substitute for the state 
with regard to extensive social tasks. Municipalities will still have a role to play in 
providing affordable and secure housing to large parts of the population. However, 
as we have attempted to demonstrate, it may in fact be a paradoxically appropriate 
strategy in “late liberal” capitalism for both government and civil society actors to 
secure common resources effectively and sustainably not by conventional public 
policies, which can quickly be overturned, but rather by contractual means, mak-
ing clever use of the property rights toolbox. Or, as Marcuse states, “the existing 
range of alternatives in use in market economies suggests that the attempt to 
 expand them even further might not be an entirely quixotic endeavor.”48
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